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TRIAL TACTICS

Someone Must Be Lying
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG

I

s it permissible for prosecutors to argue in closing to a jury that in order to find a defendant
not guilty, the jury would have to find that police
officers lied? The answer is sometimes “yes” and
sometimes “no.” The fact that there is no rule that
governs all cases means that prosecutors must take
care before arguing to the jury that someone must
be lying. It also means that defense counsel must be
prepared to object to improper argument.

The Easy Case

It is not difficult to imagine a case in which the prosecutor may argue that it is necessary to find that
a police officer lied in order to find the defendant
not guilty. Suppose, for instance, the defendant is
charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, the officer who arrested the defendant testifies
to searching the defendant and finding a pistol in the
defendant’s jacket, and the defendant testifies that
the officer “planted” the pistol during the arrest. In
this case, the only question is who is telling the truth.
Either the officer or the defendant must be, and there
is little, if any, possibility that the two simply had
different, but equally honest, perceptions of how the
gun came to be found on the defendant. In such a
case, the prosecutor would be arguing that the jury
should believe the officer; defense counsel would be
arguing that the jury should believe the defendant;
and the jury would understand that one of the two
percipient witnesses was lying.
Other cases are not so straightforward. An example
is United States v. Ruiz, 710 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2013).

The Facts of Ruiz

Two sisters saw a man walking down the street in
their residential neighborhood, holding a shotgun
and mumbling. One called 911; five minutes later a
police helicopter responded, and Officer Peck in the
helicopter saw from 300 to 500 feet in the air a man
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run around the back of a house and throw a shoebox sized item over a fence into a vacant lot. Officer
Porch arrived at the scene, searched the vacant lot,
and found a shoe box with eight to 12 shotgun shells.
Officer Verbanic arrived at the house as Raymond
Ruiz Jr. was trying to enter through the back door.
Officer Verbanic ordered Ruiz to get on the ground
and noticed a shotgun about an arm’s length from
Ruiz. The ammunition found in the shoebox matched
the 12-gauge shotgun. The sisters both identified the
man they had seen with the shotgun as Ruiz.
After Ruiz was arrested, Officer Ludikhuize took
him to a squad car, where Ruiz waived his Miranda
rights. Officer Ludikhuize testified at trial that Ruiz
told him that the shotgun belonged to his father and
that he had been trying to hide it when the police
arrived. Ruiz testified at trial and denied making the
statement. Ruiz was convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm and ammunition.

The Prosecutor’s Closing Argument

The court of appeals described the prosecutor’s closing
argument as follows:
To highlight parts of his closing argument,
the prosecutor utilized a PowerPoint slide presentation consisting of pictures of the alleged
crime scene, photographs of the witnesses who
testified at trial, summaries of the testimony
presented, and visual representations of the
jury instructions, and of the government’s key
arguments. Following a slide depicting the
first element of the offense—“the defendant
knowingly possessed the firearm or ammunition”—were three slides depicting alternative
“way[s] to find defendant guilty.” The slides
stated that the jurors could find Ruiz not guilty
“only” if they found that Officers Peck and
Ludikhuize “lied to you” and that the Fuentes sisters were mistaken. The court overruled
Ruiz’s objection to the slides.
(Id. at 1082 (alteration in original).)
The defense objection was directed to the argument
that to find Ruiz not guilty the jury would have to
conclude that Officers Peck and Ludikhuize lied. The
court summed up the defense argument as follows:
At the heart of Ruiz’s argument is his contention that the prosecutor’s statements presented
the jury with a false choice between his and the
officers’ accounts, since the officers could have
testified honestly, but nonetheless mistakenly
perceived the events on the night in question.
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This false choice, he asserts, improperly shifted
the burden of proof to the defense.
(Id.)

Fair Argument

The court quoted from several prior cases to highlight when the argument about credibility of law
enforcement officers is permissible:
As we have previously explained, “credibility
is a matter to be decided by the jury.” United
States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir.
1999). To that end, “prosecutors have been
admonished time and again to avoid statements
to the effect that, if the defendant is innocent,
government agents must be lying.” Id. (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). “It is
also true, however, that the prosecution must
have reasonable latitude to fashion closing arguments. Inherent in this latitude is the freedom
to argue reasonable inferences based on the
evidence. In a case that essentially reduces to
which of two conflicting stories is true, it may
be reasonable to infer, and hence to argue, that
one of the two sides is lying.” United States v.
Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 539
(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the prosecutor’s
statement that defendant was a liar could be
construed as a comment on the evidence) and
United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, 672 (9th
Cir. 1984) (“It is neither unusual nor improper
for a prosecutor to voice doubt about the veracity of a defendant . . . .”)); see also United States
v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 539–42 (9th Cir. 2011)
(same); United States v. Tucker, 641 F.3d 1110,
1120–21 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Prosecutors can argue
reasonable inferences based on the record, and
have considerable leeway to strike hard blows
based on the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence. A prosecutor may
express doubt about the veracity of a witness’s
testimony [and] may even go so far as to label
a defendant’s testimony a fabrication.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
(Ruiz, 710 F.3d at 1082–83 (footnote omitted).)

United States v. Wilkes

The court cited Wilkes and explained why in that
case it rejected the defendant’s argument that the
prosecutor engaged in improper burden shifting in
arguing that the defendant’s testimony was a “preposterous charade” and that “each [government
witness], if you think about their testimony and
what they told you, you either have to believe all

of those people or you believe Brent Wilkes. That’s
the choice before you. You can’t believe both.” (662
F.3d at 541 (alteration in original).)
The court explained that it rejected the defendant’s argument because the case came down to
which of two conflicting stories was true and, therefore, the prosecutor’s argument was a permissible
inference from the evidence. The court added that
the prosecutor made his argument after explaining at
length to the jury what the government was required
to prove in order for the jury to find Wilkes guilty.

United States v. Tucker

The court also offered Tucker as an example of
permissible argument. Tucker, however, addressed
prosecutor argument concerning the improbability
that a defense theory of the case was credible rather
than a comparison of government and defense witnesses. The Tucker court summarized a portion of
the prosecutor’s closing argument as follows:
The prosecutor, in her closing argument, also
commented on what the jury would have to find
or believe, in order to convict Tucker. The prosecutor said she wanted “to point out a couple
of things that you as jurors are going to have
to find to be true if you decide that the defendant is not guilty. Because for you to say that
he’s not guilty, these are the things that you have
to believe. . . .” The prosecutor went on to list
various aspects of the defense theory of the
case that the jury would “have to believe,” and
stated “[y]ou will have to believe that and that
is not logical. It’s not reasonable.’”
(641 F.3d at 1115 (alteration in original).)
The court observed that after defense counsel
unsuccessfully objected that the standard of proof
was being shifted to the defense, the prosecutor
made the following argument:
To find the defendant not guilty, remember,
you have to have some kind of reasonable
doubt. And the key word there is “reasonable”. . . . If you are gonna find him not
guilty, you also have to believe that [lists various points of the defense argument]. . . . You
will have to believe that. Because if you do not,
that means that that [sic] the personal property
in that master bedroom was the defendant’s.
It means it was his bedroom. It means that
it was his shotgun. It means that he is guilty.
You would also have to believe that the defendant did not lie. And do you believe that? . . . .
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Again, if you’re going to have a doubt it must
be reasonable; it must be based on reason.
(Id. (alteration in original).)
The Ruiz opinion noted that the Tucker court
found that the prosecutor’s argument was “inartful,” but that it was permissible because it simply
communicated that the jury would have to believe
implausible aspects of the defendant’s testimony in
order to believe that the defense theory was credible. (Ruiz, 710 F.3d at 1083–84.)

Back to Ruiz

In Ruiz, the court concluded that “the prosecutor’s
argument came very close to altering the burden
of proof.” (Id. at 1084.) The court distinguished
between comparing (1) Officer Ludikhuize’s testimony to that of the defendant, and (2) Officer Peck’s
testimony to that of the defendant.
The court recognized that “Ruiz’s testimony was
squarely at odds with Officer Ludikhuize’s testimony
in one key respect—namely, Ruiz denied confessing
to Ludikhuize that he was attempting to hide the
shotgun when police arrived.” (Id.) Although the
court did not say so explicitly, it appears that Wilkes would strongly support the conclusion that it
would have been permissible for the prosecutor to
argue that either the defendant or the officer must
be lying about whether the defendant admitted that
he was attempting to hide the shotgun. Not only is
this a rational argument based on the evidence, but
it also is an inevitable one. There is no other way to
explain the difference in testimony.
The prosecutor’s suggestion that either Officer
Peck or the defendant must be lying was neither
inevitable nor correct, as the court explained:
[Ruiz’s] testimony vis-a-vis Officer Peck’s observation of an item thrown over the fence into
the adjoining vacant lot was somewhat more
equivocal. Ruiz testified that, upon observing
Peck’s spotlight trained on his grandmother[’s]
house, he attempted to hide because he was
drinking beers with his father in violation of
his parole. To this end, he ran around the side
of the house, where he stated that he may have
thrown his beer bottle into the backyard adjoining the fence and vacant lot, but could not recall
with certainty how he disposed of the beer
bottle. Although Ruiz also testified that he did
not throw “anything” over the fence, including
the “panel” or shoe box-sized item that Peck
observed, Peck could have mistaken the size
and shape of the item thrown from his vantage
point nearly two football fields above the scene.

As the foregoing suggests, the prosecutor’s argument that either Peck or Ruiz must be lying
could well be construed as arguing an inference
unsupported by the evidence, and thereby altering the burden of proof.
(Id.)
The point the court made was that it was possible for Ruiz and Officer Peck both to be telling the
truth, which meant that the situation was very different from the comparison of Officer Ludikhuize’s
and the defendant’s testimony.

The Concern

The concern that arises when prosecutors argue that
someone must be lying is that the burden of persuasion is subtly shifted, and that courts must be careful
to ensure that jurors are not misled as to what the
government must prove. To be clear, when a prosecutor argues that for a defendant to be found not
guilty the jury must believe that police officers lied,
the jury may be misled into thinking that if it finds
that the police officers were truthful then they must
convict the defendant. This is misleading because
honest police officers may be mistaken, and even
honest police officers who are not mistaken may
not have presented sufficient evidence to meet the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
Similarly, when a prosecutor argues that either
police officers or the defendant must be lying, the
jury may be misled into believing that its task is simply to decide who is truthful and that this one decision
will be case determinative. It may well be true in cases
like Wilkes. It is certainly true that the jury in Ruiz
inevitably had to decide whether to believe Officer
Ludikhuize or Ruiz. If the jury believed the officer,
it probably would not matter very much whether
the jury also believed Officer Peck, since Officer
Ludikhuize’s testimony established that Ruiz was in
possession of a firearm. Whether or not he also possessed the ammunition that Officer Porch found in
the shoe box would not have mattered, and thus Officer Peck’s testimony would also have been of little
importance, even if discredited.

The Decision

The court of appeals ultimately did not decide whether
the prosecutor committed error in the closing argument.
Instead, it concluded that any error was harmless given
the substantial evidence adduced by the government.

Lessons

1. The Ruiz court relied in part on the fact that
before making the argument that someone must be
lying, the prosecutor gave a lengthy explanation to
the jury of the elements that the government was
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required to prove and reminded the jury of the government’s burden of proof. Prosecutors may reduce
the likelihood that an argument that crosses the line
will be found prejudicial if they take pains to be clear
to the jury what they must prove and the burden of
proof they must meet.
2. It is important for prosecutors to consider
before making an argument that either law enforcement officers or the defendant must be lying whether
such an argument is applicable to all law enforcement officers involved in the case or only some. Ruiz
highlights the importance of such consideration.

An argument that either Officer Ludikhuize or Ruiz
must be lying likely would have withstood a challenge, whereas an argument that either Officer Peck
or Ruiz must be lying likely would not have.
3. Defense counsel have the burden of objecting
when prosecutors improperly make the “somebody
must be lying” argument. The objection takes on
force when defense counsel is able to explain to the
trial judge how the argument may impermissibly
mislead the jury as to what it must believe to convict the defendant. n
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